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ABSTRACT
If there is a period in Cambodia’s history that has been overlooked
and disparaged, it is certainly the republican one (1970–1975). The
Khmer Republic is often viewed as a corrupt, incompetent regime –
an interregnum doomed to failure. This article revisits this narrative
through currently available written sources. It argues that a cultural
approach to the existing records helps us understand how such a
negative view, still prevailing today, was discursively constructed.
The analysis of the interpretations of a range of protagonists,
observers and academics contributes to a critical historiography
that might challenge assumptions and clichés about the Republic.
This implies a re-working of the ‘republican archive’, a multiform
and scattered body that presents a structural imbalance due to
the discrepancy between the limited sources coming from the
Republic itself and the significant amount of US records. The
article reassembles these archival materials. It proposes a
different reading of these documents in terms of discipline. It
suggests that this might be the first step towards reassessing the
Republic and the two dominant themes of that period: the
overthrow of head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in 1970
(which marked the end of the monarchy) and the civil war.
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Introduction
If there is a period in Cambodian history that has been both overlooked and disparaged, it
is without doubt the republican one. In his article ‘Revisiting Lon Nol’s Cambodia’, jour-
nalist Sebastian Strangio rightfully argues that the Khmer Republic remains ‘a blind spot’
caught between the Sangkum andDemocratic Kampuchea eras (Phnom Penh Post, March
18, 2010). The case of the Republic has long been judged. The regime is generally seen as
corrupt, incompetent and disunited. At best, it was a period in brackets, between the post-
independence ‘Golden Age’ and Khmer Rouge terror. For its harsher critics, it was, from
the start, doomed to failure and brought about Cambodia’s collapse. Is there another side
to this story?My aim is not to ‘rehabilitate’ the Republic. Rather, I seek to understand how
this negative view of the regime was constructed, the extent to which it might be chal-
lenged, and how sources can be used to this effect. I situate my attempt at the interplay
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of two academic bodies of work. The first one is the revision of the republics that fell to
communist revolutions in Asia and the mapping of potential arenas of inquiry in terms
of periodization, regional interactions, and culture, as has occurred, for instance, in
modern Chinese history (Chen 2017). The second, closer to Cambodia, is the work con-
ducted in the past twenty years on the Republic of Vietnam, and more specifically on
the Ngo Dinh Diem regime (1955–1963) with a view to going beyond the clichés generally
associated with it and discussing anew Diem’s project of nation-building and moderniz-
ation (Catton 2002; Miller 2013; Nguyen 2020; Vu and Fear 2020).
Since the publication of books on the topic by Ros Chantrabot (1993) and Justin Corfield
(1994), the Khmer Republic has been little studied, and it has been mostly assessed through
the disciplinary lenses of history (including military history), political science and inter-
national relations. I argue that a cultural perspective, focused on discourse analysis, might
help disentangle the narrative threads that produced this negative view of the regime and
contributed to the long-lasting influence of such an assessment. This study, I suggest,
opens the way for a discussion on the practices and methodologies that enable a critical his-
toriography of the Republic. As such, it is a preliminary step towards the revision of the
republican regime itself. The first section of the article gives an overview of the available
sources about theRepublic. It falls beyond the scopeof the article to discuss indetail the exist-
ing records and literature. Instead, I present a portrait of the ‘republican archive’ and theway
its structural imbalance shapes research.Eachof the four following sections examines thekey
narrative elements coming from a range of protagonists, commentators and academics with
respect to the interrelated themes of the ‘coup’ and the ‘civil war’. Altogether, these narrative
elements built a monolithic vision of the Republic, a vision that – needless to say – never
reflected reality. The revisitationofwritten sources, in this case, the reassembling of the exist-
ingmaterials and the attempt to read them differently, might help challenge this perspective
and reposition the Republic within a less fragmented view of Cambodia’s modern history.
The ‘republican archive’
The history of the Khmer Republic is, first and foremost, the history of its sources. By
this, I mean that, more often than not, the Republic is approached through the
records of others – its Khmer opponents of course, but mostly Western officials, diplo-
mats, political and military counsellors, journalists, scholars and activists. Republican
voices are hardly audible in such sources. What one hears instead is primarily indirect
speech. The explanation lies in the scarcity of the ‘republican archive’ itself, as Ros Chan-
trabot underlined it years ago (1993, 6). The bulk of governmental records disappeared
after 1975, probably destroyed or left to rot by the Khmer Rouge. Booklets such as those
published by the Ministry of Information on the ‘North Vietnamese invasion’ (1973) or
the 1972 report of the Khmer Republic on the war are few. Some documents, published
abroad, did survive. One finds, for instance, a number of brochures in international col-
lections, such as Tan Kim Huon’s report on universities in the Khmer Republic (Inter-
national Institute of Social History, Amsterdam) and, in a digitized form, Gaffar
Peang-Meth’s The Khmer Republic (1974).1 In other cases, the documents were taken
1Gaffar Peang-Meth was a Cambodian doctoral student in political science at the University of Michigan who became
Press and Information Attaché at the Embassy of the Khmer Republic in the US.
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into exile by evacuating officials. The son of General Sosthène Fernandez, for example,
mentions papers his father brought with him to France (CambodgeMag, 15 April 2019).
Firsthand accounts are few. The key actors of the Republic died in the hands of the
Khmer Rouge. Those who survived, in the US or in France, remained silent. Lon Nol,
for instance, never wrote anything. In this category, Ros Chantrabot’s La République
Khmère deserves special note, as both a personal account and a study based on his
PhD thesis ‘La République Khmère et l’Asie du Sud-Est’ (1978). General Sak Sutsakhan
(the Republic’s last head of state) wrote for the US army the report The Khmer Republic at
War and the Final Collapse (1980). General Fernandez’s posthumous Mémoires d’une
Guerre Oubliée was released only in 2015. As mentioned to me by journalist Richard
Werbly in a conversation on 12 June 2020, the manuscript was published in its original
form, with only a minimal reorganization of the chapters. There are certainly other
accounts, but most are unpublished. The David Chandler Cambodia Collection (Unpub-
lished Reports and Documents) at Monash University includes documents such as dip-
lomat Chhoeur Chhut’s The 1970 Coup d’Etat in Cambodia and its Consequences and a
document entitled ‘In Tam 1972’. In his article ‘Long Beach Cambodian Remembers
Dark Days of Khmer Rouge Rise’ (Press-Telegram, April 16, 2013), journalist Greg
Mellen mentions a memoir by Chhang Song (the Republic’s last minister of Infor-
mation), ‘The Loss of Cambodia.’ As far as I know, the memoir has not been published.
The only document authored by Chhang Song I found is a short text entitled ‘Le Clair-
voyant’ in writer and veteran Al Santoli’s book To Bear Any Burden (1999).2
The only substantial body of material that is readily available to researchers is that pro-
duced by the press. The National Archives of Cambodia (Phnom Penh) and the Centre
for Khmer Studies (Siem Reap) have small collections of semi-governmental monthlies
and dailies in foreign languages (Khmer Republic, New Cambodge, Le Républicain), the
Journal Officiel de la République and vernacular newspapers.3 There are also a few
issues of The Republic, the monthly launched in the US by Gaffar Peang-Meth in
January 1971. Testimonial literature (by May Someth 1987; Haing Ngor 1988; and
Boun Sokha 1979, among others) provides additional information on the Republic,
since most survivor accounts of the Democratic Kampuchea period start with the
description of life in Phnom Penh before the city fell to the Khmer Rouge. Other
elements of information about the Khmer Republic can be found in the ‘confessions’
of Communist Party of Kampuchea members tortured at S.21 and the documents pro-
duced by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Finally, yet
importantly, the Internet offers some more elements, such as interviews of former repub-
lican politicians in online media (generally at the anniversary dates of the Republic’s pro-
clamation and collapse) and private documents on websites. A group of US-based Khmer
Air Force veterans, for example, created a commemorative website, which proposes ‘texts
written from memory, with the inevitable personal perception’.4 In addition, let us
mention a number of books authored by Cambodian intellectuals and politicians, such
as Nuon Khoeun, that are available today on blogs such as KhmerBooks.
2To which one might add Chhang Song’s article ‘The Coup against Marshal Lon Nol’ in The Rasmey Kampuchea Daily in
1997.
3The John M. Echols collection (CKS) and the National Archives also include documents produced by the Ministry of Infor-
mation and messages of Lon Nol to the nation (Lon Nol 1970, 1972, 1973).
4Khmer Air Force http://khmerairforce.com/AAK-KAF/P-HOME.html (accessed December 5, 2020).
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In contrast, materials held in public archives in the US are significant. These include
governmental and departmental records: cables from the US embassy in Phnom Penh
and the State Department; reports; National Security Council and CIA memos; presiden-
tial briefs and papers; US Senate committee hearings; handbooks.5 Newspapers are a
second major source of information, especially as some of the journalists who covered
the ‘civil war’, such as Elizabeth Becker and Henry Kamm, went on to write books
about their experience in Cambodia. There are also numerous memoirs written by pro-
tagonists, including those of Richard Nixon (1990), Henry Kissinger (1979), US Ambas-
sador John Gunther Dean (2009), and accounts by military commanders who, like Major
General Ira Hunt (2013), served in the region. To which one might add the recollections
of former US officials in Cambodia – Ambassador Emory Swank, Political Counselor
William Harben – interviewed by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
for its Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, and Chhang Song and Political-Military
Counselor Jonathan Fredric Ladd, interviewed byWGBH-TV for ‘Vietnam: A Television
History’ (1982–1983).6
This structural imbalance between Cambodian and US sources explains why, to some
extent, the history of the Khmer Republic has become an American story, a sub-plot in
the grand narrative of the ‘Vietnam War’, and a historiographical ‘sideshow’, to draw on
journalist William Shawcross’s authoritative book on American policies in Cambodia
(1979). A key aspect of my research on the Republic, thus, is to address this imbalance.
My intention is not to ‘de-Americanize’ the Republic’s history. It would be preposterous
to decouple the Cambodian civil war from the conflict in Vietnam. What I instead
suggest is the need to create new relations between existing documents and ‘decentre’
the US archival materials. Due to issues of space and logistics, I have only used in this
article English- and French-speaking sources and focused on the narratives that were
articulated and circulated internationally at the time and after the fall of the Republic.
To date, little – if any – research has been done on the government and media records
from Cambodia and other countries that played an important role in the story of the
Republic: France, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, the Soviet Union, and of course
Vietnam and China. Until new studies and materials surface, however, we have to
make do with what is at hand, which means primarily what comes from a number of
available sources. These include the Cambodians who opposed the Republic (the ‘insur-
gency’), the ousted head of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk and his friends, and the
Western ‘anti-imperialist’ side, that is, the leftist and anti-VietnamWar academics, jour-
nalists, and activists who supported the insurgents.
Sihanouk had always been a communicative leader. After his overthrow, he became
even more vocal, providing international media with numerous interviews and state-
ments. Being the insurgency’s ‘commercial salesman’ on the international scene, he
also travelled a lot and held press conferences on every possible occasion. The insurgency
produced information bulletins and booklets too, mostly meant for external consump-
tion. These publications, usually in English and French, were circulated amongst
Western anti-imperialists who themselves were prolific about the struggle of the
5These materials are accessible online and/or at institutional archives and libraries in the US, (Virtual Archive). I accessed
the documents studied in the paper mostly through Wikileaks (‘Kissinger cables’), the CIA digitised library, and the
Virtual Archive of the Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University.
6Boston, MA: GBH Archives. https://openvault.wgbh.org/collections/vietnam/interviews
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Indochinese peoples against the US ‘war of aggression’. Malcolm Caldwell, Anton Claas-
sen, George Hildebrand (1976) and Serge Thion, to name but a few, gave talks, organized
events, and wrote books and articles about the conflict in Cambodia. In bringing the two
perspectives together, the American one and the ‘anti-imperialist’ one, I do not try to ‘re-
play’ the Cold War logic of confrontation between these two camps. Rather, I seek to
analyse the ways this initial confrontation became the building block on which
present-day perceptions of the Republic are still based. The extent to which these
views overlap, despite using different arguments, shows how the ‘doomed-to-failure’ nar-
rative could develop and take root across the political spectrum. This analysis, I contend,
might help ‘un-freeze’ the republican archive, a long-time prisoner of the Cold War’s icy
coating.
A contested legitimacy
On 18 March 1970, the National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom voted unan-
imously for Sihanouk’s removal from power. The process that led to the vote had started
a few days prior with a series of anti-Sihanouk demonstrations in provincial towns and in
Phnom Penh.7 The prince was accused of financial and moral corruption, and more
importantly, of treason for having facilitated and supported the presence of the Vietna-
mese communists in Cambodia. Sihanouk, who was in Moscow when he learned about
his overthrow, flew to China. For a short period, Beijing and Hanoi thought they could
come to an agreement with the new leadership (Premier and Defense Minister Lon Nol,
First Deputy Premier Prince Sirik Matak, Provisional President Cheng Heng, and Presi-
dent of the National Assembly In Tam). At stake was the delivery of weapons to the Viet-
namese insurgency through Cambodia, previously authorized by Sihanouk (Fernandez
2015, 48; Meyer 1971, 360–362). When the Cambodian government rejected this propo-
sal, China and North Vietnam decided to back Sihanouk. Zhou Enlai convinced the
prince to form an alliance with his former enemies, the communists or ‘Khmer
Rouge’, a term coined by Sihanouk himself in the 1960s to designate his opponents.
The new coalition established a double structure including a government-in-exile, the
GRUNC (Royal Government of the National Union of Cambodia) headed by Sihanouk,
and an interior resistance, the FUNK (National United Front for Kampuchea). In a radio
speech on March 23, the prince denounced his deposition as illegal and anti-consti-
tutional and called on the population to take up arms against the usurpers in Phnom
Penh.
It was only on 9 October 1970, that the Republic was officially proclaimed.8 In the
groups who had supported Sihanouk’s ouster, there were ‘hardcore’ Republicans,
especially amongst the intellectuals educated in France in the late 1940s and 1950s
(Ros 1993, 22). Yet, the first weeks of the regime confirmed the concerns of other
7Local authorities possibly organized the anti-Vietnamese demonstrations on the orders of Lon Nol’s government. The
demonstrations culminated in the march of students and civil servants to the National Assembly in Phnom Penh
and the sacking of the North Vietnamese embassy and the representation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government
of South Vietnam (11 March 1970). According to some observers, these events were staged in agreement with Siha-
nouk, who hoped that this would give him leverage in negotiating with Moscow and Beijing concessions from the Viet-
namese communists (Becker [1986] 1998, 115; Caldwell and Lek Tan 1973, 271; Corfield 1994, 64; Meyer 1971, 306).
8The ceremony did not bode well for the regime’s future. The planned 101-gun salute fire from a gunboat ended after
seven shots, the last misfiring and injuring five sailors (Kamm 1998, 87).
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major March 18 actors about the reception of such a political transformation. While
intellectuals and students in Phnom Penh welcomed the change, the situation was far
more volatile in the countryside. At the end of March 1970, revolts in Kampong
Chang and Takeo Provinces, harshly repressed by the new authorities, showed the hos-
tility of peasants towards the National Assembly and the measures it had passed
(Summers 1972, 262). The legitimacy of the new regime was thus very fragile and
relied in good part on the definition of the March 18 events. Was it a coup or a consti-
tutional deposition? This issue continues to be debated in Cambodia to this day, and the
republican archive gives a good insight into the different positions. The republican side
argued its case clearly. What had taken place was a strictly Khmer affair (and as such, a
matter of sovereignty) as well as a legal action, in conformity with the Constitution,
carried out by an entitled institution. It was the National Assembly that had nominated
Sihanouk head of state in 1960. What it could do, it could undo. The prince had long
exceeded his mandate (constitutionally limited to four years) and was thus in an uncon-
stitutional position at the time of his deposition.9 Moreover, Sihanouk’s removal from
power was a response to popular aspirations.10 The demand for a democratic govern-
ment had sprung ‘spontaneously in the national capital and provincial cities, spread to
universities and schools, infected the press and exploded in an irreversible tide’
(Khmer Republic, September 1971). By deposing Sihanouk, the new leaders had simply
listened to and acted upon the anger from the street.
For most observers, however, if 18 March was not a coup, it looked very much like
one. In all likelihood, the anti-Sihanouk demonstrations were staged. Orders to gather
students, monks, and civil servants and make them march to the National Assembly
had come from top levels. The leaflets and posters were printed in advance by the Min-
istry of Information and Education. In the days preceding the vote, the military presence
in Phnom Penh had been increased, with tanks and armoured vehicles patrolling the
National Assembly area, and the houses of prominent pro-Sihanouk people put ‘under
protection’. The deputies had been threatened before the sessions and forced to write
their names on their ballot paper. There were even armed troops inside the chambers
during the debates (Becker [1986] 1998, 116; Caldwell and Lek Tan 1973, 264–265;
Corfield 1994, 76–77; Meyer 1971, 317, 321; Ros 1993, 18–22; Sihanouk 1973, 44). If it
was a coup, who was behind it? For diplomatic circles and the international press, the
army’s involvement made little doubt. Parallels were drawn between Indonesia and Cam-
bodia, Sukarno and Sihanouk, Suharto and Lon Nol, or between Lon Nol and Georgios
Papadopoulos, the head of the 1967 military coup in Greece (‘Pragmatic Cambodian
Leader’, The New York Times, March 19, 1970; Sihanouk 1973, 12).
Of course, Sihanouk tried to ‘set the record straight’. Later on, drawing on journalist
TD Allman’s articles in The Guardian (August and September 1971), he denounced a
long-planned ‘putsch’ executed by a group of traitors with the help of the CIA (1973,
20, 27. 44). Daniel Roy, Sihanouk’s press advisor in the 1960s, published in Le Monde
Diplomatique a long analysis, according to which the ouster was the product of a
power struggle between different clans, those of Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and nationalist
leader Son Ngoc Thanh’s (June 1971). Charles Meyer, another French advisor and
9‘Why a Republic?’ and ‘Prince Sihanouk’s removal is constitutional’ in New Cambodge, no. 1, May 1970.
10‘Non, ce n’était pas un coup!’ Le Républicain, October 15, 1974.
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assistant of Sihanouk, thought it was ‘the convergence of a military coup and a palace
revolution’ (1971, 325). In general, observers agreed that March 18 did not emerge
from a popular movement of revolt but from a minority of power-thirsty individuals.
Against this reductive view, leftist academic Malcolm Caldwell and GRUNC/FUNK
representative in London Lek Tan argued that the coup was not just the result of
clique manoeuvring, but part of larger dynamics and social forces (1973, 274–275). Fur-
thermore, observers considered that the coup was not an ‘indigenous’ but a remotely
guided event, in which the Americans (or at least the CIA) and their regional ‘friends’
had a hand (Kahin 2002, 282). Charles Meyer was one of the few who interpreted the
events as an entirely Cambodian affair originating in Sihanouk’s gradual slip of power
from the 1960s onwards (Chandler 1972, 730).
The Republic was thus often seen as being doubly illegitimate, an American ‘puppet’
state that represented no-one but itself, as the GRUNC/FUNK publications claimed it.
The US government denied any involvement in the events. Indeed, the Americans saw
the regime change as a poor political choice. Bring the monarchy back, the US Ambas-
sador to Laos urged Washington: ‘We are convinced that a republican form of govern-
ment is most undesirable and untenable at this time’ (quoted by Corfield 1994, 82). At
best, the Republic was a pragmatic move that might solve some state legitimacy issue,
but it could be done with as soon as it had fulfilled its function. As for Western leftists,
they saw the abolition of the monarchy as a trick of the ‘small educated stratum’ who had
shed ‘‘“feudalism” in the form of the monarchy’ in an attempt to look modern (Caldwell
and Lek Tan 1973, 273). Yet, the violence of the ‘de-Sihanoukisation’, as journalist Henry
Kamm called the iconoclastic wave that gripped Phnom Penh in March and April 1970,
points to something more complex (1998, 53). For a while, the plotters had pondered
Sihanouk’s assassination, before rejecting the idea (Caldwell and Lek Tan 1973, 270;
Corfield 1994, 57). Yet, if the prince could not be eliminated physically (he was sentenced
to death in absentia in July 1970), he could at least be erased from the public space, and
therefore perhaps from people’s minds. His photos were removed from billboards. The
newspapers and the national radio conducted an unrelenting smear campaign against
him and his wife, Princess Monique. In New Cambodge, Nuon Khoeun underlined the
‘rare violence’ with which the Cambodian press had been attacking Sihanouk and inter-
preted it as the ‘explosion of anger of a suppressed people’ (‘Prince Sihanouk’s removal is
constitutional’ New Cambodge, no. 1, May 1970, 53). For French newspaper Le Monde
correspondent Jean-Claude Pomonti and pro-FUNK historian Serge Thion, it was
nothing short of a ‘regicide’, rooted in ‘Oedipus’ complex of the plotters vis-à-vis Siha-
nouk (1973, 160, 157). The psychological dimension does not explain it all. The streets
named after kings and queens were rechristened. The adjective ‘royal’ was eliminated
from official writings and inscriptions. It was the entire ancien régime that had to go.
The abolition of the monarchy encapsulates the ambiguities of the Republic (and poss-
ibly of March 18 itself, in a grey zone between coup and deposition). The
‘de-Sihanoukization’ was an ad hominem attack, a cathartic moment for the new
leaders and some segments of the population who had long resented the prince and
his policies. This emotional episode also had a rational side. It aimed to defuse Sihanouk’s
nuisance potential in the event of his return to Cambodia. At the same time, the ‘de-Siha-
noukization’ was the destruction of a system deemed anachronistic and dangerous.
Through (symbolic) foundational violence, the regime signalled that there was no way
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back. Even constitutional monarchy was not in the plan. The previous decade had shown
how quickly Sihanouk, who might have had democratic intentions at the beginning, had
reverted to the despotic rule of the ‘god-king’. This was proof that the monarchic system
was incompatible with democratic institutions and had to be replaced (New Cambodge,
May 1970). Among the political personnel and intellectuals who supported the republi-
can regime, some saw it as their mission to write a new page of Khmer history. By negat-
ing the ancien régime, they created the very thing from which they proposed to break off,
and so doing, they defined who they were and what they wanted for their country.
The issue that looms large behind the definition of the events is that of the relationship
between the birth of the Republic and the awakening of political consciousness in Cam-
bodia. As we have seen, there was, on both the American and ‘anti-imperialist’ sides, a
widespread rejection of the new regime’s capacity to embody popular political aspira-
tions. Still, whatever happened in March 1970 did because there was in Cambodia a
broader desire for change. Faced with a rapidly changing world, the Khmers were in
search of the ‘new identity’ that Sihanouk had failed to provide despite his modernization
policies (Chandler 1991, 191). The Republic was thus the logical consequence of Siha-
noukism. By improving the educational system, the Sangkum period had produced a
new generation of intellectuals and students but not followed-up with jobs, social
status or political representation. With its promise of a new era, the Republic responded
to the frustrations of this nascent class. Since Cambodia had gained its independence
(1953), the relation between leadership, militancy/engagement and pedagogy had been
a problem, as many Cambodians saw the world of politics as the preserve of the privi-
leged. It was now the Republic’s turn to redefine this relationship within a new model
of nation-building. The ‘republican archive’, however, gives limited insight into the
republican conception and implementation of this relationship. What it allows us to
understand, though, is how this widely shared dismissal of any serious republican politi-
cal project was discursively articulated and sustained.
Personalities politics
From the start, the Americans, officials and journalists alike, saw the Republic as an expe-
diency born through ‘last-minute improvisations’ and ‘borrowed forms devoid of mean-
ingful content’ (Kamm 1998, 87). The US archive materials make it difficult to think
differently about the Republic. Now and then, the US embassy cables and reports
praise Cambodian politicians, such as Long Boret, whose nomination as prime minister
in 1973 was met with approval, and ‘energetic and fairly competent’ or hardworking
young ministers like Thach Toan, Kim Vien, and Chhang Song
(1975PHNOM05248_b).11 Yet, this was outdone by a general view of the republican pol-
itical scene as filled with ‘personalities’. The term, used by Sihanouk a few days before his
removal, became for US officials and CIA analysts the framework by which they under-
stood Cambodian political dynamics. For the Americans, everything in the Republic
boiled down to the ‘bickering and personal political maneuvering’ of officials
11The paper uses the numbering system of Wikileaks: year, provenance of the cable (PHNOM for the US embassy in
Phnom Penh, STATE for the Department of State in Washington DC, PARIS for the US embassy in Paris), and the refer-
ence number of the collection.
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(1973STATE098300_b). The pragmatic US approach to politics clashed with what CIA
analysts described as the ‘byzantine and contentious nature of Cambodian political
life’.12 Ambassador Dean saw it as the duty of the US embassy to step in every time it
looked like the Khmer government could not function properly
(1974PHNOM13020_b, 1974PHNOM06315_b). The attempt could go far since Dean’s
idiosyncratic style was not averse to micro-management on certain occasions. In
March 1975, for example, he organized himself the luncheon for the congressional del-
egation visiting in Phnom Penh, for fear that the Cambodians, left to their own devices,
would be unable to project the ‘atmosphere of austerity and military determination’ that
was needed in order to convince the delegates of the Republic’s dedication to the pursuit
of the war (1975PHNOM03776_b).13
The personality-oriented view was partly correct (Corfield 1994, 171). Even Ros Chan-
trabot blamed the failure of republican politics on the petty motivations and rivalries of
Cambodian politicians (1993, 58). It was also largely shaped by Orientalist clichés. The
political procedures of the Khmers were ‘strange’ and ‘[made] sense only to them’.14
Cambodian politicians were emotional and mercurial (In Tam, for example,
1973PHNOM08216_b). From ‘personalities’ to colourful characters, there is but one
step, that was often easily jumped. New York Times journalist Donald Kirk, in search
of ‘la guerre populaire’ (popular war), describes the parody of propaganda he came
across in Kompong Speu. General Fernandez (not yet commander-in-chief of the
Khmer National Armed Forces or FANK) spent more time stuffing himself with meat,
rice and whisky than addressing the villagers he was meant to cheer up (June 27,
1971). Kirk’s article offered a welcome counterpart to glossy accounts of popular enthu-
siasm in the republican media. Yet, the journalist’s exotic opera buffa with Fernandez as a
local Falstaff was also characteristic of the tendency among international correspondents
to paint the Republic in a farcical light. The patronizing, even condescending tone of
American governmental records and, to some extent, of the media is striking. It requires
the researcher to read the materials if not against the grain, at least with great caution.
The work of Ann Laura Stoler (2008), Michel-Ralph Trouillot (1995) and Sonal
Khullar (2015) – to name but a few scholars who addressed the question of the
archive and asymmetrical power relations – has taught us to consider the affective
states and silences of records. This shows the importance of making the republican
archive a ‘relational’ one in the sense that it gets linked to a new social/cultural
context of interpretation, defined by postcolonial and decolonial views.
This is nowhere more evident than in the treatment of the Republic’s leader, Marshal
Lon Nol, often depicted as a mystical loon. To warn Washington of the situation, US
embassy Political Counselor William Harben compiled accounts of Lon Nol’s measures,
such as the monk-bless bullet-proof T-shirts for soldiers. Some are nonsensical, to say the
least: yet, it is revealing that Harben entitled his report ‘The Anthropological Lon Nol’, as
12CIA memorandum 1633/73. ‘Lon Non, Cambodia’s prime troublemaker,’ 16 March 1973 (CIA-
RDP85T00875R00110060041).
13The delegation flew from Saigon on March 2, 1975. It included Senator Bob Bartlett (Democrat), and representatives
Frank McCloskey (Democrat), Bill Chappell (Democrat), Bella Abzug (Democrat), John Murtha (Democrat), and Millicent
Fenwick (Republican), accompanied by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Philip Habib and
Deputy Assistant Secretary Erich von Marbod.
14Political-Military Advisor Fred Ladd quoted in memorandum from Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 21 April 1971
(LOC-HAK-512-5-6-1).
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though observing the Marshal demanded an ethnographic eye.15 The international press
did not deal kindly with Lon Nol either, whose reliance on astrologers and magic was
often ridiculed, for instance by Judith Coburn in the Far Eastern Economic Review
(March 1972) or Henry Kamm and Mark Gayn in The New York Times (January and
April 1973, respectively). Moreover, Lon Nol’s theories about Mon-Khmer civilization
and his dream of a pure Khmer race were mostly considered mere fantasies. In ‘Cambo-
dia Prints Lon Nol Thought’, Sydney Schanberg reported that Lon Nol’s book of thoughts
The New Khmer Way had been derided in Phnom Penh circles (The New York Times,
January 7, 1973). Few observers took the Marshal’s ideas seriously. Journalist Elizabeth
Becker is one of them. She noted how these fantasies had long haunted Cambodia’s
vision of national identity and could appeal to common people ([1986] 1998, 120–
121). Seen against the backdrop of the stroke Lon Nol had suffered in February 1971,
however, these fantasies also cast doubts over the Marshal’s physical and mental aptitude
to lead the country. His health was carefully monitored. The reports of his Cambodian
and American physicians were transmitted to the embassy, the Department of State
and the Pentagon (1974PHNOM09849_b). Under such conditions, the question arises
of the support the US government provided to Lon Nol despite potential opponents
and the threats of a military takeover (1973PHNOM03397_b).16
In American circles, opinions over Lon Nol were divided, reflecting the tensions
between various groups who held contrasting views about US intervention in Cambodia.
For the White House, Lon Nol was the ‘predominant political figure’ in the country and,
as such guaranteed Cambodia’s stability (1973STATE059091_b). On the other hand, the
Pentagon and the CIA warned of the effect of the Marshal’s ineptitude and suggested that
the presidential elections of June 1972 could be used to get rid of him (Shawcross [1979]
1986, 231–233). The opposite happened. In spite of the ‘skulduggery’ that ensured Lon
Nol’s success, and which they were fully aware of, the US government and embassy
praised the result as the victory of democracy.17 To what extent was the information
filtered? Ambassador Emory Swank and Deputy Chief of Mission Thomas Enders did
not report everything to Washington (Harben, Self interview, 1998, 55; Shawcross
[1979] 1986, 275). In contrast, Swank’s successor Ambassador Dean complained regu-
larly about Lon Nol’s shortcomings and ramblings and thought he did not give the
nation ‘the kind of leadership which inspires men to sacrifice’ (1974PHNOM04853_b;
1975PHNOM03148_b; 1974PHNOM06315_b). Apparently, President Nixon and
Henry Kissinger thought differently. Lon Nol was exactly the kind of leader they
needed. They knew from the start that the Marshal was a ‘loose cannon’. After his
meeting with Lon Nol in May 1970, envoy General Alexander Haig had described him
as ‘an emotional and not very realistic leader’.18 As William Harben put it succinctly,
it was the Marshal’s incompetence that had gained him his appointment (quoted by
Shawcross [1979] 1986, 235).
The real question, then, is why the US government made no effort to find a suitable
alternative. The straitjacket thinking about personalities in official and intelligence
15William Harben, Self-interview, 1998, 55–56.
16See also message from John Holdridge to Henry Kissinger, 27 March 1973 (LOC-HAK-32-2-12-0) and National Security
Council memorandum, William L. Stearman to Henry Kissinger, 17 September 1973 (LOC-HAK-39-3-24-9).
17President’s daily brief, 9 June 1972 (CIA-RDP79T00936A010800080001-9).
18CIA online library: Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, 26 May 1970 (LOC-HAK-503-2-6-4).
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circles explains it partly. It combined with a disregard for civilian politics. Ambassador
Dean saw the National Assembly members as ‘irresponsible free agents’
(1974PHNOM07864_b). ‘[Politically] conscious Cambodians’ were described as ‘conge-
nital oppositionists’.19 The Khmer political scene was primarily judged in binary terms:
Lon Nol versus Sirik Matak, or Lon Nol versus Sihanouk, when the latter’s possible role
in negotiations began to emerge. This left little discursive space for any third force that
tried to emerge. The Americans did not take seriously the proposals for change Cambo-
dian politicians such as Keng Vannsak or Son Sann discussed with them. They quickly
brushed them aside, unless they endangered US interests (1973PHNOM11405_b;
1973PHNOM07967_b; 1974PHNOM00526_b). It was essential not to derail the strategy
that had been devised inWashington – a strategy that did not care much for reformism in
Cambodia. To the US government, the very idea of a republican political project
appeared irrelevant within the wider context of the Second Indochina War. Deprived
of this dimension, the Republic was thus reduced to a façade, a scenery for the meaning-
less agitation of its protagonists, a political void not meant to last.
Something is rotten in the Republic
This view was not exclusively American. In Le Monde Diplomatique (April 1970), Daniel
Roy explained that new political ideas in Cambodia could not come from the ‘blues’
(landlords, businessmen opposed to reforms, pro-US personalities, and the organized
crime), but only from the ‘reds’ (intellectuals from poor classes, youth eager for
reforms, workers, teachers and a few liberal personalities). The ‘anti-imperialist’ leftists
blamed the Republic’s political vacuum on social class. The ruling class was not revolu-
tionary enough and therefore could not embody the ‘revolutionary strength [that] had
been growing steadily in Cambodia long before the coup in response to domestic political
and economic factors’ (Caldwell and Lek Tan 1973, 274). Even Cambodian intellectual
Vandy Kaonn considered that the bourgeoisie lacked republican convictions and was
thus unable to generate the ‘revolutionary romanticism’ critical to the change of
regime (1993, 123). For Pomonti and Thion, the Republic’s anti-Communism and
anti-Vietnamese racism masqueraded as a political programme, but they could not
replace an actual one (1973, 182).20 It was generally thought that Lon Nol and Sirik
Matak had used the ‘Vietnamese aggression’ for internal political ends (Sihanouk’s
removal) and with a view to harnessing domestic and international support for the
new regime. Of course, the republican media presented the founding of the Republic
as an act of patriotism and the start of the resistance against the enemy (New Cambodge,
January-February 1972). Charles Meyer, however, had a different interpretation. The
‘war was the reason the regime did not collapse’ immediately after it was established
(1971, 330). It had enabled a strong and immediate mobilization of the population,
some segments of which deeply resented the Vietnamese, as was demonstrated by the
violence against the Vietnamese ethnic community living in Cambodia in March and
19CIA Memorandum. ‘Political developments in Phnom Penh. Period of unrest due to Lon Nol’s action with respect to the
National Assembly,’ 26 October 1971 (CIA-RDP85T000875R00110000127-5).
20There was obviously more to it. Lon Nol saw the conflict as a civilization war against the thmil (the impure).
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April 1970 (‘Refugee and Civilian War Casualty Problems in Laos and Cambodia:
Hearing before the Subcommittee’, May 1970).21
For the Western Left, the main argument for the absence of a republican political
project was that the Republic was the continuation of the old system in a new guise.
The concentration of power in the hands of one man and his clan, the governance by
decree (thanks to the ‘nation in danger’ law and states of emergency), the suspension
of the National Assembly, the freedom of the press being regularly curtailed, the rights
of assembly, domicile, and correspondence being suspended reminded of Sihanouk’s
authoritarian rule. The old monarchy might be dead but the ‘general architecture
[stayed] in place’ because it represented the interests of a class (the Cambodian ‘bour-
geoisie’) that would never relinquish its privileges (Pomonti and Thion 1973, 193).
This architecture was the legacy of the French Protectorate (1863–1953) and of the
elites and institutions it had produced. In the same way, as Sihanoukism had never
really broken away from the colonial period, the Republic was not a radical break
either from Sihanoukism. The system now in a late stage of decay was the long nineteenth
century. The advent of the Republic marked the ‘culmination of a process of internal
decomposition that was accelerated by the Indochinese conflict and fueled by the
regime’s internal contradictions’ (Pomonti and Thion 1973, 156).
The theme of decomposition was ubiquitous in ‘anti-imperialist’ and American ana-
lyses and media. This theme found a most powerful expression in the Republic’s endemic
corruption. In the early days, the republican leadership had pledged to eradicate this
plague inherited from the Sangkum era. However, the Sangkum personnel had remained
in power positions and corruption had returned with a vengeance. It was ‘an integral part
of political action’ (Ros 1993, 102). The highest echelons, generals and ministers with
access to American military and economic aid, were involved: brass trafficking (Decem-
ber 1973), diversion of aviation gas from FANK to the civilian sector (April 1974),
trafficking of exit permits for Khmers at the Ministry of Interior (January 1975), and
the wages of FANK ‘phantom’ soldiers (1973PHNOM12210_b; 1974PHNOM02940_b;
1975PHNOM02101_b). These scandals were reported in US governmental
cables (1973PHNOM14296_b; 1973PHNOM14450_b; 1974PHNOM05245_b;
1975PHNOM00543_b), the international press and Khmer non-governmental newspa-
pers, insofar as the latter could write about it without being threatened or shut down.
Corruption had spread everywhere. In the context of a hyperinflation-riddled war
economy, multiple forms of bribery and corruption were practised on a smaller scale
too – civil servants, doctors, nurses, soldiers, teachers, shopkeepers (Steinbach and Stein-
bach 1976, 62–65). The Republic, as a political body and society, appeared thus rotten to
the core.
If the theme of decomposition could take hold so easily – besides the fact that it was
attuned to the atmosphere of fin de règne in Phnom Penh – it is because it also had a
strong resonance with the larger narrative of Cambodian history that, since the 1930s,
21Pogroms and killings made hundreds, possibly thousands, of victims. International outrage and the reaction of the
Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia’s new ally, forced the Phnom Penh leaders to put an end to the violence. See the state-
ment of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the machine-gunning of a hundred Vietnamese
civilians in Svay Rieng. Wire stories on Killing of Vietnamese Residents in Cambodia, 2430203023. Vietnam Center and
Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive. 12 April 1970, Box 02, Folder 03, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 15 – Cambodia, Vietnam
Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.
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many Khmer intellectuals had adopted. This narrative came, for a great part, from the
French colonizers. As many other European imperial powers in the late nineteenth
century, the French were preoccupied ‘with the themes of decadence and decline’,
which they projected in turn onto their colonies. In Cambodia, this projection became
the trope of the vanishing Khmer, always on the verge of extinction (Edwards 2007,
7–14). It paved the way for viewing the Republic as ‘doomed-to-failure’. Decomposition
spoke to the insurgency as well. In his article ‘Cambodian Regime Slips Economically and
inWar’, journalist David Shipler reported a conversation with an American analyst about
the strategy of the Khmer insurgents (The New York Times, June 19, 1974). They do not
want to overrun Phnom Penh, they wait for its collapse, the man told him. ‘Their feeling
is that this society is so corrupt and so putrefied – a regime ready to die in the Marxian
sense – that all it needs is some pushing.’ Former Provisional President of the Republic
Cheng Heng had heard the same analysis, but from members of the GRUNC he knew
personally. As he reported to the American embassy in Paris, the men had told him
that the Khmer communists thought ‘it was necessary for the fruit to ripen’
(1974PARIS18384_b).
This ‘ripening’ echoed older ideas of imminent disappearance. At the same time, it had
roots in Marxism-Leninism. For the Khmer Rouge, the outcome (the fall of the Republic)
was inevitable once the objective social conditions for the revolution would be fulfilled or
‘ripe’. In contrast to the Republic’s decomposition, the insurgents presented themselves
as healthy forces of change embodying progress, democracy, sovereignty and freedom
(GRUNC 1972). In the republican media, the Khmer component of the insurgency
had long been invisible and inexistent. Cambodian guerrillas were just ‘Vietnamese pro-
paganda for external consumption’ and ‘figments of fertile imagination’.22 The ‘other
side’ – as the insurgents were to be called – fought for regaining its visibility. Its emer-
gence into the public arena became closely tied then with this discourse of rejuvenation.
The ‘anti-imperialist’ leftists bought it and saw in the (increasingly probable) victory of
the FUNK good reasons for optimism. Shortly, they thought, Cambodia would finally
enter the postcolonial era (Pomonti and Thion 1973, 149).
(Un)stable states
The ‘ripening’ of the Republic had another meaning for the Americans. It related to
Henry Kissinger’s theorization of conflict resolution, according to which ‘stalemate is
the most propitious condition for settlement’ (The New York Times, October 12,
1974). Conflict studies often refer to this principle within the context of ‘ripeness
theory’, when the conflict’s escalation leaves the belligerents with little choice but
working out a solution together.23 Stalemate was the objective to be reached in Cambo-
dia. Once the two parties would agree on a cease-fire and sit at the negotiating table, the
US government considered a range of options for the country’s future: either a partition
on the Korean and Vietnamese model or a coalition government with representatives of
the two sides on the Laotian model. The latter option explains why John Gunther Dean,
22‘The Constitution,’ Khmer Republic, vol. 1, no. 1, September 1971, 76.
23The ‘ripe moment’ happens when the escalation and intensity of a crisis lead the parties involved to a ‘mutually hurting
stalemate’ that forces them to engage in negotiations (e.g. Zartman 1985; Hass 1988; Pruitt 2005).
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one of the architects of the Laotian solution, was appointed in Phnom Penh in 1974.
Cheng Heng’s warning that the Laotian model could not work in Cambodia because
of differences in monarchical traditions and the conflicted relationship between Siha-
nouk and Sirik Matak fell on deaf ears (1974PARIS14805_b). The US view of the situ-
ation was defined by both a ‘lack of American diplomatic imagination’ (Clymer 2004,
62) and the pursuit of ‘Vietnamization’ (the transfer of the war effort to local powers
and the withdrawal of American troops from the region).
From the start, there was thus a fundamental misunderstanding between Phnom Penh
and Washington on the meaning of US intervention in Cambodia. ‘How soon will the
Americans come to help us? I was asked by ministers and pedicab drivers’, Henry
Kamm recalls, wondering whether they knew ‘their timing was completely off’ (1998,
37). The republican leaders believed that the Americans would not let them down
because they did not want communists taking over the area (Ros 1993, 116). More
than a political imperative, intervention was a ‘moral obligation’ from the US to their
country, as Cambodian politicians sometimes told their American interlocutors (Dean
2009, 92; Peang-Meth 1974, 15). The Americans, however, saw their engagement in Cam-
bodia only as a step towards their disengagement from the Indochinese war theatre. The
year 1973 was a turning point in this process. The signature of the Paris Peace Accords by
Hanoi, Saigon and Washington (January 27), the resulting general cease-fire in Vietnam,
and the end of US tactical air support to the Khmer Republic (August 15) created a new
environment for the Cambodian conflict and its resolution. With the Vietnamese out of
the picture, there was a shift from a fully military solution to a negotiated one (Ros 1993,
121–122).
This certainly played a role in the gradual official recognition of the indigenous nature
of the rebellion. The ‘war of aggression’ became a civil war, and the ‘other side’ increas-
ingly real. By then, the insurgency looked nothing like it was in 1970. It had grown and
radicalized, and the Khmer Rouge had purged their ranks from Hanoi influence (Whi-
taker et al. 1973, 189; Kiernan [1985] 2004, 357–365). At first, the republican government
began by publicly admitting the presence of Khmers among the insurgents. Cambodian
guerrillas were just cannon fodder manipulated by external forces (Fernandez 2015, 114,
117). Later on, the insurgents became brothers who were misled by an ‘alien’ ideology
(1975PHNOM03767_b). Then, the term ‘enemy’ itself disappeared from the official dis-
course and Lon Nol launched a call to the ‘fellow citizens from the other side’, as reported
in the daily Le Républicain, (October 11, 1974). The Republic made the insurgency
several peace offers.24 The Americans encouraged the move. In a letter to Lon Nol
(August 1973), special advisor and counter-insurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson
suggested a new ‘psychological campaign’ conveying the message ‘that Khmers should
not fight Khmers, they have only done so because of the foreign invader; if the foreign
invader leave… , there will be no problem in reaching a settlement’
(1973PHNOM08775_b). The idea of an ‘entre-nous’ negotiation fit within the belief of
the republican leaders that everything could be arranged with the insurgency chiefs,
with whom they had studied or worked in the past, or even had family ties
(1973STATE116455_b). Yet, the insurgency’s lack of response to the Republic’s openings
24The peace offers included the six-point one (6 July 1973) and the unconditional one (9 July 1974, repeated in August
and November 1974).
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showed that the old-boy network was meaningless for ‘the other side’, which instead pro-
duced a list of seven (soon expanded to twenty-one) ‘traitors’ to be executed after the
victory.
The discursive transformation of the ‘war of aggression’ into a civil war gave the US
additional means of pressure on the Republic. The Phnom Penh leaders were told that
now that the American public was no longer interested in supporting a strictly Khmer
conflict, the White House had to work hard to keep a strong hand with Congress
(1973PHNOM03200_b). Anything that weakened its position (coup threats, cabinet
reshufflings) was viewed as a problem (1974PHNOM06588_b, 1974PHNOM07769_b).
Under such conditions, the duty of the republican leadership was to maintain the
balance or, as Sir Robert Thompson put it, to establish ‘a state of stable war’.25 This
notion of stability strongly resonated with an older narrative, that of Sihanouk’s tightrope
politics in preserving Cambodia’s neutrality. However, it was a special kind of stasis the
Republic was asked to perform, under the American eye, in every possible field – social,
economic, political and military. Being the dominant factor in all aspects of the Repub-
lic’s life, US aid was possibly the only thing standing between the Republic and collapse.
To keep getting it, the Cambodians had to demonstrate all the time their will to survive.
Khmer Air Force veterans, for example, recall that ‘we constantly had to prove our capa-
bilities before obtaining the minimum aids’. Survival became a performative feature of
the Republic, something to be said, repeated and enacted on every occasion. In his
first courtesy call to Lon Nol, Ambassador Dean made it crystal clear: ‘I raised the
need for Cambodians to make maximum effort in every field of endeavor… to convince
the US that they should continue to receive the full support that Phnom Penh is presently
getting to withstand communist aggression.’ To which the Marshal replied that he was
‘fully aware of the need for the Khmer to prove that they are worthy of continuing US
assistance’ (1974PHNOM04853_b).
The republican archive suggests, though, a more nuanced view. Some materials point
to the inertia or resistance the Cambodians sometimes opposed (not necessarily for good
reasons) to American orders. Journalist Marcel Barang, for example, observes that while
the republican leaders did their best to give the impression that they met American
expectations, they systematically undermined anything that could challenge the status
quo (Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1973). Nevertheless, the relationship between the
US and the Republic remained a ‘highly dependent’ one (1973PHNOM09170_b).
When the first signs of withdrawal appeared around March 1975, many Cambodians
saw the likely departure of the Americans with anxiety, anger and a strong feeling of
betrayal. The newspaper Koh Santipheap, for instance, claimed that the naive Cambo-
dians were sacrificed at the altar of US interests (1975PHNOM04933_b). In some
cases, the betrayal took a personal dimension. General Fernandez, for example, tried
to disassociate the American technicians on the ground, who were ‘men with whom
we often had personal friendly relations’, from the ‘doves’ in Congress who did not hes-
itate to sacrifice the Cambodians (Fernandez 2015, 107, 112). Sirik Matak’s last letter to
Ambassador Dean, as he refused the latter’s offer to evacuate with the US embassy staff,
read, ‘I have committed only one mistake, that of believing in you, the Americans.’
Looking back at that period, Chhang Song once declared, ‘We try [sic] so hard to
25Report, 17 February 1972 (CIA-RDP80R0172R001300060010-7).
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please the Americans but… I think we should not have done that… because the with-
drawal of the Americans was decided upon without taking into consideration all the
Cambodian affairs’.26
In the end, there was no stalemate, no ceasefire, no settlement. Instead of assisting the
two parties into working out a negotiated solution, Ambassador Dean found himself, in
the first days of April 1975, driving the US embassy car with the flags flying through the
more populated sections of Phnom Penh to dispel rumours of American departure
(1975PHNOM05946_b). A week later, he himself folded the American flag brought
down the embassy’s pole, before evacuating to Thailand. What the republican archive
tells us is a story of abandonment. The US governmental records do not give the Cam-
bodians much space. Still, read in a certain way, with attention for the unheard, they
make it possible to capture the human dimension of this desertion and the feeling of exis-
tential threat that imbued the Republic’s every move, and which, to no small extent, con-
tributed to the enduring idea of the inevitable end of the regime.
Conclusion
The Republic is a political spectre that continues haunting Cambodia to this day, as
might be seen with recent verbal skirmishes between the US and Chinese embassies
in Phnom Penh, after Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen delivered a speech in
which he made a direct connection between the coup, the civil war and Democratic
Kampuchea (Dech Mara, The Phnom Penh Post, February 1 and 4, 2019). Despite
the persistence of the ‘doomed-to-failure’ closed narrative, there are still many unre-
solved matters when it comes to the Republic. That the latter keeps fuelling political
tensions in Cambodia signals how urgent it is to reconsider the history of the repub-
lican regime. The article proposed a critical historiography based on new archival
assemblages of records and the attempt to read the materials in a different way. It
showed that the overlaps of the US governmental (and sometimes journalistic) and
‘anti-imperialist’ discourses produced in part the negative view of the Republic that
still dominates our present-day understanding of that period. This kind of historiogra-
phy, I argue, might open the way for future inquiries into the Republic. While this
article invites a renewed discussion of the narratives by which the Republic was rep-
resented internationally, subsequent studies might go further by deploying Khmer
sources and shed a new light on Cambodia’s intellectual history and vernacular political
ideas. Moreover, the regime’s temporal scope, its relations with regional and inter-
national powers, and many more aspects, including media, visual culture, and
gender, demand further investigation. This reassessment of the republican period is
crucial to rethinking Cambodia’s history of modernization and transformation in the
twentieth century.
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